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This paper shows that subsidy competition may be efficiency enhancing. We model a subsidy 
game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model, where capital can freely move 
among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated. We study subsidy competition, starting 
from an equilibrium where the industry core is inefficiently locked in to the smaller region. 
When regions weigh workers' and capitalists' welfare equally, the core region will set its 
subsidy low enough that the industry relocates to the larger region, restoring an efficient 
allocation. When workers' welfare is weighted more heavily, the core may pay subsidies that 
are high enough to prevent a relocation of industry. 
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The many merits and drawbacks of capital tax competition and other forms of locational or
jurisdictional competition have been established in a by now sizable literature.1 This paper
advances a novel argument in favor of tax competition: ine±cient lock-ins of industry can
potentially be overcome, and a shift to a more e±cient equilibrium be induced, through
competition in capital subsidies.
Ine±cient lock-in situations are well-known from the ¯eld of technology adoption (David,
1985; Arthur, 1989). Arguably the most famous example is the computer keyboard, which
despite technologically superior systems today still has the same layout { a succession of
letters beginning with QWERTY in the topmost row { as the old typewriter.
Decreasing unit costs and multiple equilibria are also a hallmark of the new trade
theory and of economic geography. This research has unveiled that `history matters' for
national or regional specialization, and that it cannot be assured that the best equilibrium
is chosen. Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) provide a simple textbook example that countries
can get locked into undesirable specialization patterns when industries are competitive and
there are external economies of scale at the country level: two countries, Switzerland and
Thailand, are both (potentially) able to supply the world demand for watches at decreasing
average costs. Although Thailand could (by assumption) do so more cheaply at any scale,
the Swiss industry, has (historically) established its industry ¯rst. This head start and
the associated scale of production implies that the Swiss industry has lower unit costs
compared to a Thai watch ¯rm which considers to enter the market, but realizes that it
could not competitively produce the ¯rst unit in isolation (i.e. given that a watch industry
is yet non-existing in Thailand). Path dependencies and hysteresis e®ects in location have
similarly been shown to arise in the more recent economic geography models (see e.g. Fujita
et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003). Anecdotal evidence documenting that agglomeration
patterns may persist even though the initial factors have vanished over time have been
presented early on by Krugman (1991a,b). More recent econometric evidence documented
in Redding et al. (2007) reinforces the hypothesis that history may matter: they ¯nd that
the temporary shock of the division of Germany after World War II had a permanent e®ect
on industry location in the sense that there are no signs that the associated shift of the
German air hub from Berlin to Frankfurt is only temporary.
1Recent surveys of this literature are provided in Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and in Wilson (1999).
1These lock-in e®ects { in the ¯elds of technology adoption, international trade and
economic geography or other ¯elds { have in common that a shift from (say) an ine±cient
equilibrium to a potentially more e±cient equilibrium is prevented by a coordination fail-
ure among the agents. The starting point of our analysis is a situation of an ine±cient
lock-in of industry, where no single ¯rm ¯nds it pro¯table to shift location even though
a coordinated move would make all of them better o®. Following Martin and Rogers
(1995), we develop a simple two region model of monopolistic competition. The commer-
cial relations between regions consist of intra-industry trade based on love-of-variety on
the part of consumers and mobility of physical capital. We make two key assumptions.
First, as in Martin and Rogers (1995), regions may di®er in size. Given the assumption
that ¯rms produce with internal increasing returns, and in the absence of other di®erences
between regions, this has the well-known implication that the larger region attracts a more
than proportionate share of ¯rms (the `home market e®ect'). Second, there are localized
intra-industry spillovers (e.g. knowledge spillovers) among monopolistic producers and also
inter-industry spillovers from the modern sector to the other sector.2 Accordingly, local
marginal production costs are lower, the more numerous local ¯rms are. Taken together,
these two key assumptions imply that, given a suitable set of parameters, the model has
two stable equilibria which can unambiguously be welfare-ranked. One equilibrium has all
¯rms concentrated in the larger region, exploiting both the advantages of the large market
and the advantages associated with the external economies. However, quite intuitively, if
the intra-industry spillovers are strong enough there also exists a second, ine±cient equi-
librium where all ¯rms concentrate in the smaller region but are unable to coordinate on
a shift to the more e±cient equilibrium.
Our subsidy game starts from such an ine±cient equilibrium, where all the industry is
located in the smaller region (say region 2). Governments are assumed to dispose of one
instrument, direct capital payments, which are ¯nanced through non-distortionary taxes,
and which can be o®ered to the capital owners. Following a recent literature, we assume
that the subsidy game is in three stages (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and
2 Localized external economies of scale have obtained strong empirical evidence. See the surveys by
Audretsch and Feldman (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and the recent paper by Badinger and
Egger (2008), which ¯nds strong empirical evidence in favor of intra-industry spillovers and also, though
less strong, inter-industry spillovers for OECD manufacturing. Indirect evidence of intra-industry spillovers
is provided by Devereux et al. (2007) who ¯nd that ¯rms of a speci¯c industry respond to subsidies only
in the region which already hosts a critical share of the respective industry.
2P°Ä uger, 2006): in the ¯rst stage, the core region (the government in region 2) sets its
subsidy, in the second stage, the government in the periphery (region 1) chooses its capital
subsidy and the market allocation then unfolds in the third stage. The welfare functions of
the regional governments are utilitarian with possibly di®erent weights attached to workers
and capital owners in their region.
Our main results are the following. If governments attach equal weight to capital
owners and workers, then region 2 will never defend the core. Rather, it will accept that
the more populous region 1 snatches the core by o®ering a capital subsidy which is just high
enough to induce all capital to relocate. Intuitively, the larger region has an advantage
in the competition game, because the agglomeration rent accruing to capital owners is
larger when all capital is located in the larger region. Although residents of the smaller
region bene¯t from a lower price index and higher wages when the core is located in their
region, given that subsidies to capital accrue to capital owners in both regions, it becomes
too costly for the government of the (smaller) core region to hold on to the core once the
(larger) periphery actively bids for ¯rms. Joint welfare as well as welfare in the two regions
then increases. If, by contrast, governments assign a higher weight to workers' than to
capital owners' welfare, there is a set of parameters where the smaller region defends the
core, the ine±cient lock-in persists, the periphery gains and the core loses in comparison
with the situation before the start of this subsidy game. Intuitively, although allowing
capital to relocate would allow capital owners to bene¯t from subsidies paid by the new
core, this bene¯t would weigh less than the loss incurred in the form of lower wages and
higher prices when the core region lets its industry go. Hence, in this case, the core will
want to defend the core, even though global e±ciency would rise if all industry were located
in the larger region.
Our paper is related to several strands of previous research, neither of which has come
up with the argument in favor of subsidy competition advanced here, however.
First, our paper is related to the literature on tax competition. The traditional lit-
erature in this ¯eld is based on models with perfectly competitive markets and stresses
that, as a result of ¯scal externalities, taxes and government expenditures are bid down
by benevolent governments to sub-optimal levels. There are circumstances, however, when
tax competition may be favourable, notably when without such competition tax rates are
ine±ciently high. In this spirit, Edwards and Keen (1996) show that tax competition max
help tame Leviathan governments, and Kehoe (1989) shows that tax competition may
3alleviate excessive capital taxation in the absence of government commitment. However,
lock-in situations do not arise in this traditional literature.
Second, a more recent literature reconsiders tax competition in the presence of mar-
ket power on goods markets.3 Research in the tradition of the new economic geography
(typically) uses models of monopolistic competition and shows that the government in the
core region is able to maintain a higher tax on capital than the government in the periph-
ery.4 A result similar in spirit has been obtained by Hau°er and Wooton (1999). They
show that in the competition to attract a foreign-owned monopolist, the government of the
larger region is able to achieve this at a lower cost than the small region government. This
result is based on the fact that the monopolist { similar to the ¯rms in the di®erentiated
goods sector in models of the new economic geography { has a locational preference for
the larger market. Di®erent market sizes are also studied by Ottaviano and van Ypersele
(2005) who analyse monopolistic competition with mobile capital but without endogenous
agglomeration, to show that, under certain conditions (notably when trade costs are low
enough) tax competition is e±ciency enhancing.
Even though our model has much in common with these studies, there are important
di®erences, the most important one being that an ine±cient lock-in { our starting point {
has not been considered in this literature. The papers on tax competition and economic
geography analyze symmetric-identical regions which are endogenously driven into a core-
periphery constellation. Due to this fundamental symmetry, from a welfare perspective it
is immaterial which region ends up being the core { hence there is no welfare improvement
associated with a switch of the core.5 Hau°er and Wooton (1999) and Ottaviano and van
Ypersele (2005) allow for di®erent market sizes, but they do not consider local external
economies. Hence, the tension between local intra-industry spillovers and market size
considerations, which gives rise to an ine±cient lock-in is not present in their models.
Finally, there is a literature which addresses the coordination failure that emerges in
models with decreasing average costs. In the context of city-industry equilibria considered
in urban economics, the sustainability of ine±cient lock-ins is contested by the idea of
pro¯t-seeking `land developers'. The idea, put forward by Henderson (1975), holds that
3Important work in this area is by Janeba (2000). See also the surveys cited in footnote 1.
4See Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Borck and P°Ä uger (2006), Kind
et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000). See also Janeba (1998).
5Note, however, that this does not imply that the a core-periphery constellation is necessarily the
welfare optimum. See e.g. Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) and P°Ä uger and SÄ udekum (2008).
4the existence of more e±cient city sites can be exploited by forward-looking developers,
who, by this e±ciency di®erential, are able to pro¯tably organize `city corporations', and,
hence to restore an overall e±cient allocation. This idea has been revived by Rauch (1993)
who shows that discriminatory pricing of land over time on the part of developers is key to
the removal of such ine±ciencies. Another mechanism to overcome multiple equilibria and
coordination failures arising under external economies of scale has recently been worked
out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). They analyze a model where production
of ¯nal goods uses a continuum of tasks, each of which has a zero weight, and which can
possibly be performed in two locations. They show that, by becoming external suppliers
for these tasks, even 'small' agents can alleviate coordination problems.
Our analysis relates to these works insofar as we also address the coordination issue.
In a non-technical paper, (Duranton, 2008, p.40) has recently put forward the intuitive
notion that territorial competition can improve the spatial allocation of plants because
\the places for which the external e®ects are the strongest are expected to bid the most".
We provide a formal analysis which is much in this spirit, but where the interaction of
external economies and market size is key.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model and the locational equilibria. A welfare analysis is conducted for symmetric and
asymmetric region size. Section 3 analyzes the outcomes of subsidy competition between
asymmetrically sized regions. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Set Up
The model builds on Martin and Rogers (1995). The world consists of two regions, indexed
by i = 1;2, which are symmetric in preferences and technology. There are two sectors.
The modern sector (M), characterized by increasing returns, monopolistic competition
and iceberg trade costs, produces a composite of industrial varieties. Spatial distance is
modeled using iceberg trade costs. To consume one unit of a variety produced abroad,
¿ > 1 units have to be shipped; the remainder melts away in transit.
The perfectly competitive traditional sector (A) produces a homogenous good under
constant returns to scale. The A-good is taken as the num¶ eraire good and hence, its price
5is normalized to one, pA
i = 1. We assume that the traditional good is produced in both
regions and is traded without costs across regions.
There are two input factors, capital and labor. Each worker owns of one unit of labor
and each capitalist one unit of capital, which they both supply inelastically. The mass
of workers and the mass of capitalists are both normalised to unity. Region 1 hosts the
share sl of workers and the share sk of capital owners. Labor is immobile across regions
and employed in both sectors. Capital is employed in the modern sector only, and each
¯rm requires one unit of capital. Capital can be freely moved across the two regions, but
capital owners are immobile. We assume perfect portfolio diversication: each capitalist
owns an equal share of the international portfolio which delivers the return snr1+(1¡sn)r2,
where ri is the return to capital invested in region i and sn is the share of capital (and,
hence, ¯rms) installed in region 1. The capital income of region 1 is therefore given by
sk(snr1 + (1 ¡ sn)r2).
2.2 Preferences and Demand
Households derive utility from consuming a range of di®erentiated modern goods and the
traditional good. Preferences are represented by a two tier utility function, where the
upper tier function is logarithmic quasi-linear and the lower tier utility function is CES.
The utility function of a type-h individual (capitalist or worker) in region i is6
Uih(Aih;Mi) = ®lnMi + Aih for h = K;L: (1)
A type-h individual in region i receives income yih. We assume 0 < ® < yih;i = 1;2;h =
K;L, to assure that both types of goods are consumed by all individuals in each region.
Aih denotes consumption of the num¶ eraire good and ® the amount of income spent on















; ¾ > 1; i 6= j; (2)
where mii denotes consumption of a variety produced domestically and mji denotes con-
sumption of a variety produced abroad. The constant elasticity of substitution between
6To simplify notation, we use the fact that { due to quasilinear utility { all individuals consume the
same amount of modern goods.







¿pj(v)mji(v)dv + Aih = yih; (3)
where pi and pj denote the producer prices of a respective variety. Solving the utility
maximization problem yields the following demand functions, mii(v), mji(v), Mi and Aih
and indirect utility Vih:














Vih = yih ¡ ®lnPi; (6)
where P1 denotes the CES price index in region 1 which already takes symmetry of producer
prices into account. An analogous expression holds for the CES price index of region 2.
2.3 Production
We will henceforth derive all expressions for region 1 only. The corresponding expressions
for region 2 are analogous.
2.3.1 Traditional sector




1 is labor input and qA
1 is output. The term ¹sn captures inter-industry spillovers, with
¹ > 0. The larger the domestic share of ¯rms, sn, the higher is the marginal productivity
of labor and the more units of the A-good can be produced with a given labor force. Due
to perfect competition labor is paid its marginal product. Hence, we get w1 = 1 + ¹sn.7
7Note that contrary to previous economic geography models which assume that the immobile factor
earns the same reward irrespective of whether employed in the concentrated or in the peripheral region we
allow for a higher wage rate in the region where industry is agglomerated.
72.3.2 Modern sector
The representative ¯rm in region 1 produces one variety using one unit of capital (the ¯xed






q1 + r1; (7)
where q1 is a ¯rm's output in region 1. Its ¯xed costs are given by r1 and its marginal
costs are determined by the variable input requirement and by the wage as previously
determined. Intra-industry spillovers ° have a positive e®ect on the productivity of a ¯rm.
The proximity to other producers in the same industry generates knowledge spillovers which
lower ¯rms' variable costs. Inter-industry spillovers, on the other hand, drive up wages in
the region and hence, the ¯rm's variable costs. In line with the empirical evidence we
assume that spillovers are stronger within an industry than between di®erent industries,
i.e. spillovers increase industry speci¯c skills of a worker more than general skills.8 The







q1 ¡ r1: (8)
Market clearing requires a ¯rm's supply q1 to be equal to aggregate demand, which consists
of domestic and export demand, including the indirect demand associated with the iceberg
trade costs:
q1 = m11(sl + sk) + ¿m12((1 ¡ sl) + (1 ¡ sk)): (9)
Equation (9) uses the familiar result that mill pricing is optimal in the Dixit Stiglitz model.










Using the zero pure pro¯t condition and applying mill prices from (10) yields the break
even output q1 of a ¯rm:






8See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey of the evidence.
82.3.3 Short run equilibrium
In the short run, the allocation of capital and hence the allocation of ¯rms is exogenous.
Eqs. (10) and (11) then immediately imply ri = (piqi)=¾, i.e. the capital reward captures
operating pro¯ts. Using this result as well as the mill prices from (10) and the market
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and Á ´ ¿1¡¾ is the level of trade freeness, with 0 · Á · 1.
2.4 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the symmetric case
In the long run, capital is mobile and moves to the location where it earns the highest
return. We assume that this movement is governed by the ad-hoc adjustment equation:
_ sn = (r1 ¡ r2)(1 ¡ sn)sn:
A long run equilibrium is de¯ned as a situation where capital no longer moves across
regions. In this model, there are two types of locational long-run equilibria. Depending on
the relative strength of centripetal and centrifugal forces industry will be either dispersed
(symmetric interior equilibrium, where r1 = r2) or agglomerated in one single region (a
core-periphery equilibrium) at sn = 0 (with r1 < r2) or sn = 1 (with r1 > r2).
The di®erent locational equilibria which emerge for di®erent levels of trade costs are
depicted in Figure 2 for the case where regions are equal sized. The parameters are ® =
0:3,¾ = 4, ¹ = 0:5, sl = sk = 0:5,° = 1.9
A symmetric equilibrium is stable for low trade freeness, e.g. Á = 0:17. Starting from
sn = 1=2, increasing region 1's industry share lowers the capital reward gap (r1 ¡ r2)
implying that ¯rms will have an incentive to move back to region 2. A core-periphery












Figure 1: Locational equilibria








Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram
10outcome is stable for high trade freeness (Á = 0:75) but unstable for low trade freeness.
For intermediate trade freeness (Á = 0:24), all three allocations, the symmetric interior
equilibrium and the two core-periphery equilibria are stable.
2.4.1 Locational forces
The market allocation is driven by di®erent agglomeration and dispersion forces which can
be identi¯ed by making use of (12) and (13).10
Intra-industry spillovers are an agglomeration force. A higher local industry share
lowers the variable input requirement and raises ¯rms' operating pro¯ts. Thus, more
capital is attracted to that region.
The local competition e®ect (also termed crowding e®ect) and intra-industry spillovers
act in favor of a dispersed outcome. The competition e®ect describes the tendency of ¯rms
to produce in regions with only few competitors. Starting from a symmetric allocation of
industry, increasing the share of industry in one region (for given production costs) drives
down operating pro¯ts in that region. This will in turn discourage capital owners to supply
their capital there. The second dispersion force works through the worker's wage rate. A
higher number of ¯rms lowers variable costs but, due to inter-industry spillovers, the wage
paid to workers in the core exceeds the wage paid in the periphery. Higher production
costs in turn lower ¯rms' operating pro¯ts which discourages a movement of capital into
that region.
2.4.2 Symmetry Breaking
To assess the stability of the di®erent long-run equilibria we derive the market break point,
ÁB, which is the threshold level of trade freeness above which the symmetric equilibrium
becomes unstable.
Figure 2 depicts the stability of long run equilibria for symmetric region size. The
model exhibits a subcritical pitchfork. As soon as Á exceeds the critical break point ÁB,
the only stable equilibrium is the core-periphery outcome. The expression for ÁB is given
in Appendix A. The break point depends in intuitive ways on the parameters: when
agglomeration forces become stronger, ÁB falls, so that the range of trade freeness levels
at which the symmetric equilibrium is stable shrinks. This is the case when intra-industry
10A formal exposition of the forces of the model can be found in Appendix C.
11spillovers increase (higher °), inter-industry spillovers decrease (lower ¹) or ¾ decreases,
which means higher economies of scale at the ¯rm level.
2.4.3 Agglomeration rent and sustain point
Next, we assess the stability of the core-periphery equilibria and derive the level of trade
freeness ÁS (the `sustain point'), up to which a core-periphery equilibrium can be sustained.
When all industry is agglomerated, say, in region 2, capital earns an agglomeration












+ [(1 ¡ sk) + (1 ¡ sl)]Á
¶¸
: (14)
which is the loss that a ¯rm would incur if it were to relocate from region 2, the core, to
the periphery region 1, given that all other ¯rms stay in the core.
The sustain point solves ­2(Á;¢) = 0. At this level of trade freeness, the agglomeration
rent is zero so that full agglomeration is viable for Á > ÁS. The expression for ÁS is
presented in Appendix B. Again, stronger agglomeration forces decrease the sustain point,
which means full agglomeration can be sustained for smaller levels of trade freeness. This
is the case when intra-industry spillovers increase, inter-industry spillovers decrease, or ¾
decreases.
Moreover, the overlap between the sustain and market break point depicted in Figure 2
re°ects the range of levels of trade freeness at which both types of equilibria, the symmetric
as well as the core-periphery outcome are stable.
2.4.4 Welfare Analysis
To study the welfare e®ects of a reallocation of industry, we ¯rst derive the indirect utility
functions of workers and capital owners in region i:
VKi = ¡®lnPi + snr1 + (1 ¡ sn)r2; VLi = ¡®lnPi + wi; (15)
where w1 = (1 + ¹sn) and w2 = (1 + ¹(1 ¡ sn)). Regional welfare is assumed to be the
weighted sum of indirect utilities of capital owners and workers residing in the respective
region. We let the government attach a weight ¸ to workers' welfare. Then regional welfare
is given by:
W1 = ¸slVL1 + (1 ¡ ¸)skVK1; W2 = ¸(1 ¡ sl)VL2 + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ sk)VK2: (16)
12For weak ° and low Á, residents of any region unambiguously lose as the share of
industry in their region declines, since to consumer prices rise and wage rates fall. Residents
of the agglomerating region experience a welfare increase since they save on transport costs
on imported varieties and workers earn a higher wage rate. By contrast, the e®ect of a
reallocation of ¯rms on regional welfare is ambiguous for strong intra-industry spillovers
and high Á. For instance, for high °, at sn = 0 even residents of region 1 may bene¯t from
an agglomeration in region 2, since consumer prices are low due to strong spillovers. If at
the same time Á is su±ciently high, the bene¯t from lower producer prices exceeds the cost
of importing industrial goods. However, with an ongoing reallocation of industry towards
region 1 the gains from intra-industry spillovers decline, increasing consumer prices, thereby
hurting households in both regions.
Next, to check whether the arising location pattern is socially desirable (i.e. whether
there is too much or too little agglomeration), we compare the social planner's choice of
industry allocation to the market outcome. Since con°icting interests among residents of
di®erent regions make the Pareto criterion unapplicable, we apply a utilitarian concept
and assume the social welfare function to be the sum of household's indirect utilities
W = W1 + W2. We assume that the social planner takes market prices as given and
only decides over the allocation of industry.11 Figure 3 depicts the social welfare function
for di®erent levels of trade freeness and symmetric region size.
While partial agglomeration is never optimal for the social planner, a symmetric al-
location is chosen at low Á and a core periphery equilibrium at high Á. We denote by
ÁSB the level of trade freeness at which the social planner is just indi®erent between im-
plementing a symmetric allocation or a core periphery outcome. Formally ÁSB solves
Wjsn= 1
2 = Wjsn=1 = Wjsn=0. Comparing ÁSB with ÁB allows us to detect whether the
market outcome is socially desirable. It turns out that the social break point lies below the
market breakpoint for our parameter restrictions,12 which implies that for ÁSB < Á < ÁB
the market exihibits under-agglomeration (see also Figure 2). Given that our model in-
cludes external economies, this is not really surprising.
11P°Ä uger and SÄ udekum (2008) show that the resulting allocation is the same as when the planner can
implement ¯rst-best welfare, which also corrects for the price distortion in the industrial sector stemming
from imperfect competition.













Figure 3: Social welfare: symmetric region size
2.5 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the asymmetric case
So far we have assumed regions to be equally endowed with the immobile factor. In
this section, we generalise the model to allow for di®erences in regional workforces. In
particular, we consider region 1 to host more workers than region 2, so that sl ¸ 1
2.
2.5.1 Region size e®ect
Recall that capital moves in search of the highest nominal reward where the capital reward
rates are given by (12) and (13). For simplicity we will assume that regions are equally
rich in capital, i.e. each region owns half of the world capital stock (sk = 1=2) but they
may di®er in the number of workers. This gives rise to another agglomeration force, which
we term region size e®ect. This describes the tendency of ¯rms to produce in the larger
market and to export to the smaller market.13 Formally, the market size e®ect is derived
by di®erentiating the capital reward gap with respect to the share of immobile workers


















13The region size e®ect is actually made up of two e®ects: the market size e®ect described above, and
the factor proportions e®ect: the larger region has larger relative supply of labour.
142.5.2 Bifurcation diagram and agglomeration rent
Once we allow regions to di®er, the symmetric equilibrium can no longer be stable. The
blue curve in the bifurcation diagram in Figure 4 identi¯es stable equilibria for di®erent
levels of Á, assuming sl = 0:8. For low levels of trade freeness a stable asymmetric interior
equilibrium emerges, where the larger region (region 1) hosts more than half of the total
industry. However, for high Á, both the core in the large region as well as the core in the
smaller region constitute stable equilibria.








Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram for asymmetric region size
Both core-periphery equilibria, sn = 1 and sn = 0 are stable, since all ¯rms, once
agglomerated in the region, earn a positive agglomeration rent. As Figure 5 shows, however,
for Á < 1, the agglomeration rent is clearly higher when all industry is in the larger region.
Our model then allows for the possibility that the entire industry is concentrated in
the smaller region, despite the fact that ¯rms could earn a higher agglomeration rent if all
industry were located in the larger region.14 This new feature of the asymmetric model is
14The literature typically assumes that there exists some coordination failure or absence of rational
expectations (e.g. lack of information or costs that hinder ¯rms to relocate) which makes ¯rms unable or
unwilling to commit to relocate (see Baldwin et al. (2003) or Krugman (1991c)). Without this assumption
it becomes di±cult to justify the existence of multiple equilibria. Krugman (1991a) argues that rational
expectations are hard to justify since they call for a degree of information and sophistication that is
15W1
W2






Figure 5: Agglomeration rent for asymmetric region size
in contrast to the `footloose capital' model described in Baldwin et al. (2003) and used by
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005)15 where the larger region always hosts a larger share
in industry irrespective of the underlying level of trade freeness.
2.5.3 Welfare
We stick to our de¯nition of global welfare as the sum of regional welfare levels, where
W1 and W2 are given by (16). Figure 6 depicts the social welfare function for asymmetric
region size and di®erent levels of trade freeness.
Note that for low Á (e.g. Á = 0:05 in the Figure), partial agglomeration, with the larger
region hosting a larger share in industry, is socially desirable. For su±ciently high Á, global
welfare is maximized when all industry is agglomerated in the large region:
Proposition 1 For Á > ÁSB, we have W(1) > W(0) i® sl > 1
2.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¥
unreasonable.
15In Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), for high trade costs there is a stable interior asymmetric
equilibrium, where the larger region hosts a larger industry share, whereas for low trade costs all industry
will be agglomerated in the larger region.
16Φ=0.05
Φ=0.4






Figure 6: Social welfare: asymmetric region size
The intuition for the result is that when the core is in the larger region, the majority
of households bene¯t from a lower cost-of-living index and higher wages.
However, as outlined above, our model allows for a stable core-periphery equilibrium
in the smaller region. It therefore allows for an ine±cient but stable allocation of industry.
Figure 4 shows the welfare optimal allocation of industry as the red curves: The ¯gure also




We are interested in the outcome of subsidy competition in the presence of technological
spillovers. Assume that the level of trade freeness is su±ciently high such that originally,
industry is agglomerated in one region. Each regional government maximizes welfare of
its residents by using subsidies to in°uence capital owners' investment decision. The core
region, say region 2, as well as the periphery bene¯t from retaining or attracting ¯rms
since hosting the industry core increases welfare of immobile factor owners residing in the
core through lower transport cost (`cost-of-living e®ect') and a higher wage rate. In order
to derive analytical expressions for the di®erent subsidy levels we model subsidies zi in
17their simplest form, namely as a direct lump-sum payment to capital owners. Firms move
according to the highest post-subsidy capital reward rate, rs
i = ri + zi. Laborers' and
capital owners' endowment is taxed in a lump sum fashion to ¯nance subsidy payments.
The regional budget constraints are:
z1sn = T1(sk + sl); z2(1 ¡ sn) = T2((1 ¡ sk) + (1 ¡ sl)): (18)
For region 1, total subsidy payments are the subsidy times the share of ¯rms sn, while tax
payments are lump-sum taxes paid by the sk capitalists and sl workers.
Government expenditure and tax revenue are zero once the region happens to become
the periphery, since there are no ¯rms to subsidize. Inserting the price indices from (5)
as well as the post-subsidy capital reward rates, wage rates and tax payments into the
indirect utility functions, using (16) allows us to derive regional welfare both for the case
where region 1 hosts the industry core and for the case where region 1 is the periphery
(the expressions for region 2 being analogous):
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are the price indices for the core and periphery
case, respectively. Whereas welfare of a peripheral region is increasing in the subsidy
level o®ered in the core region, it decreases in its own subsidy level as soon as it hosts
the industry core. This is due to the ownership structure of capital and the regional
¯nancing scheme. Since capital income is repatriated to the region of origin and subsidies
are ¯nanced via regional taxes, each capital owner residing in the periphery bene¯ts from
a subsidy distributed in the core region. Welfare of the core is falling in its own subsidy
level, since it is entirely ¯nanced by residents of the core, but part goes to capital owners
residing in the periphery.
We adopt the same game structure as Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and apply a se-
quential move game. In the ¯rst stage the government of the core (Govt 2) sets its subsidy
level, the periphery (Govt 1) then chooses its subsidy in the second stage. In the third stage
18¯rms choose their location of production dependent on the gross capital reward rates. Pro-
duction and consumption take place as described in the preceding sections. We continue
to assume that sk = 1=2 but allow for asymmetries in region size in terms of the number
of workers and in particular allow for the possibility that the initial core region is smaller
than the periphery. As before, we suppose that sl ¸ 1
2, so that region 1 is larger, but region
2 is the core, so that the equilibrium without subsidies is ine±cient since the core is in
the smaller region. Hence, in contrast to the previous literature, we allow for a situation
where the initial factors (e.g. market size) which caused this agglomeration have vanished
over time but where locational hysteresis has led to a persisting ine±cient agglomeration,
where ¯rms continue to produce in the smaller region. Di®erences in region size are only
allowed to the extent to which welfare of the smaller core region, W C




exceeds the welfare level in the periphery case, W P
2 (z1) ´ W2
¯
¯
sn=1 such that the outcome
of the subsidy competition game does not become trivial.16
3.1.1 Stage Two: Periphery's Decision
In stage two Govt 1 (the periphery) decides whether to induce a relocation of the industry
core or to stay out of the competition and leave the allocation of industry unchanged.
However, due to the existence of agglomeration forces Govt 1 will not achieve any movement
of capital if it sets its subsidy too low. In order to induce ¯rms to relocate, the subsidy
level has to be at least as high as the agglomeration rent accruing to ¯rms in the core
plus the core's subsidy rate, i.e. zmin
1 (z2) = ­2 + z2. This would make a capital owner
indi®erent between staying in the core { realising the agglomeration rent ­2 { and being
paid a subsidy of z2, or moving to the periphery and being paid z1. Inserting ­2 using (14)














Any subsidy level below zmin
1 (z2) will fail to induce a relocation of ¯rms. Clearly, whether
Govt 1 decides to enforce a relocation by setting a subsidy level equal to zmin
1 depends on
the subsidy level set by the core government in the ¯rst stage. Govt 1 chooses its subsidy
16Otherwise the bene¯ts of hosting the industry core in the form of lower living costs and higher wage
rates would not su±ce for the government of the core region to engage in a costly subsidy competition.




1 (z2) if W C
1 (z1) > W P
1 (z2);
0 otherwise.
Intuitively, for Govt 1 to engage in the competition, welfare after having successfully at-
tracted all industry (W C
1 (z1)) has to exceed the welfare level for the case where region 1
remains the periphery (W P
1 (z2)). Using this decision rule, we are able to derive the max-
imum subsidy level zmax
1 that Govt 1 would be willing to incur. This subsidy level solves
W P
1 (z2) = W C
1 (zmax
1 ). To enhance intutition we evaluate the resulting subsidy levels at
¸ = 1=2 for the time being and turn later to the case of unequal welfare weights. Using






¸=1=2 = 2¹sl +
®(1 + 2sl)
1 ¡ ¾
lnÁ ¡ z2: (22)
The ¯rst term in (22) captures the potential `wage e®ect' for region 1's workers that
will occur if Govt 1 succeeds in attracting the industry core. The second term captures
the `cost-of-living e®ect' which enters through the price index prevailing in the respective
region.17 This term is positive since ¾ >1 and lnÁ <0. Finally, the last term expresses the
`subsidy e®ect' for each of region 1's capital owners. The higher z2 set in the ¯rst stage,
the lower will be zmax
1 , i.e. the lower will be the willingness of Govt 1 to attract the core.
It follows that as soon as zmin
1 (z2) ¸ zmax
1 (z2) Govt 1 will no longer be willing to attract
the core, since the necessary subsidy is so high that the gain from attracting the core is
lower than the cost.
3.1.2 Stage One: Core's Decision
Turning to the ¯rst stage, Govt 2 acts as a Stackelberg leader, foreseeing the implications
of its choice on the choice of Govt 1 in the following stage. Since Region 2 welfare falls in
its own subsidy, Govt 2 will want to set the lowest subsidy level consistent with defending
the core, if it wants to defend at all. This subsidy level, zd
2, is that at which the periphery in






























17Due to symmetric spillovers both regions bene¯t from high intra-industry spillovers through lower
prices. Hence, any disparity in consumer prices between core and periphery stems from trade costs only.
20Therefore, Govt 2 will set its subsidy at zd
2 if its welfare when it defends the core exceeds
the welfare it receives when becoming the periphery. Otherwise, it would set a subsidy of
zd
2 ¡", where " is a small positive number. The reason is that by raising its subsidy, Govt
2 raises the subsidy which Govt 1 has to pay in order to attract industry. This bene¯ts







2 if W C
2 (zd




2 ¡ " otherwise.
3.2 Equilibrium
Having derived the decision rules of the respective players and the according subsidy levels,
this section identi¯es the outcomes of the game.
3.2.1 Equilibrium 1: Relocation of industry
Whether Govt 2 decides to defend the industry core depends on how much Govt 2 values
workers' relative to capitalists' welfare in region 2. We start with the case where workers
and capitalists' welfare is equally weighted.
Proposition 2. For equal welfare weights, ¸ = 1=2, Govt 2 will never defend the core for
any sl ¸ 1





d ¡ ") with
some small " > 0.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¥
By setting z2 = zd
2 ¡", Govt 2 ensures that region 1 snatches the core o®ering zmin
1 (zd
2 ¡
"), thereby restoring an e±cient allocation of industry. At the same time, since z2 raises
zmin
1 , Govt 2 realizes the highest possible repatriation externality by setting z2 = zd
2 ¡ ",
which will bene¯t region 2's capitalists via the repatriation of capital income. This result is
rather intuitive, in the sense that the larger region has a `natural advantage' in the subsidy
game: when the core region is small, the agglomeration rent is small too. This implies that
the periphery government has to o®er capital owners a relatively small subsidy to induce a
relocation. It also implies that the periphery government will be more willing to snatch the
core, since the payo® to doing so increases with sl. Hence, defending the core will be more
costly for the core government. In fact, it becomes so costly that for a symmetric welfare
21function, the core will only be defended if it is located in the larger region. In other words,
subsidy competition restores an e±cient allocation of industry. The next result states that
welfare is then higher if it would be without subsidies and the core located in the smaller
region.
Proposition 3. For zd
2 > 0,







2 ¡ ") > W(0;0);
(ii) region 1's residents experience a welfare gain after having successfully attracted all







2 ¡ ")) > W
P
1 (0):
Proof. See Appendix D. ¥
What cannot be unambiguously determined is whether the new periphery region (region
2) will be worse or better o® after the relocation of industry compared to the initial welfare.
On the one hand, a relocation of industry induced by a positive subsidy level set by Govt
1 imposes a positive externality on capital owners' income in the new periphery. Half of
the subsidy payment promised to industrial ¯rms by Govt 1 accrues to capital owners of
region 2. On the other hand, region 2 loses all industry thereby su®ering from a lower
wage rate and a higher cost-of-living index. Overall welfare however, will be higher after
the relocation of industry towards an e±cient industry allocation. This is an important
result, since it shows that ¯scal competition can help redress an ine±ciency stemming from
increasing returns to scale.
3.2.2 Equilibrium 2: Persistent ine±cient industry allocation
In this subsection, we look at the case where the welfare function assigns a higher weight
to workers than to capitalists. We may think of a government which leans towards repre-
senting worker interests, for distributional or political reasons.
Once we allow for ¸ > 1=2, region 2's welfare di®erential W C
2 (zd




is no longer unambiguously negative for sl > 1=2. This opens up the possibility that the
core region will defend the core even if it is smaller and e±ciency would require locating
22all industry in the larger region. Intuitively, for ¸ = 1
2 and sl > 1
2, we have just shown that
the bene¯t capitalists incur through the repatriation of subsidies when the core moves to
region 1 more than outweighs the loss to workers and capitalists through lower wages and
a higher price index. When ¸ > 1
2, then, the core government weighs the loss to workers
from falling wages and rising consumer prices after industry relocation more heavily than
the gain to capitalists from the subsidies paid by the foreign government. In particular,
we can show the following:
Proposition 4. There exists a region size ~ sl = sl(°) such that region 2 defends the core















Proof. See appendix D. ¥
Figure 7 plots ~ sl for ¸ = 0:8 in order illustrate the e®ect of region size and localization
economies on core's decision. For all sl;°-combinations above ~ sl, the core government will
not defend the core and industry will relocate towards the larger region 1; for all sl;°-
combinations on and below ~ sl, the core government defends the core and the allocation of
industry remains ine±cient. Most importantly, note that there are sl;°-combinations for
which Govt 2 decides to defend the industry core against region 1 despite region 1 being
larger in terms of workers (the shaded region in Figure 7). Hence, the disadvantage from
becoming the periphery which predominantly a®ects workers via reduced real wage income
exceeds the bene¯t of a relocation (the subsidy e®ect) for governments acting in workers'
interests. Figure 7 also shows ~ sl for ¸ = 1
2, which is horizontal at sl = 1
2: in this case, the
core defends if and only if it is the larger region.
Intuitively, the ¯gure shows that an ine±cient industry allocation can persist only if the
di®erence in region sizes is small and if spillovers are relatively large. On the one hand, for
given °, a larger sl implies that it will be more and more di±cult for the (smaller) core to
keep the industry from leaving. Larger spillovers imply that the core will be more willing
to hang on to the core. On the one hand, the costs of retaining the core are reduced, since
the agglomeration rent increases and Govt 2 therefore has to pay higher subsidies to snatch
the core. On the other hand, this means that if Govt 2 defends, capital owners do not
23bene¯t from the higher subsidy paid by region 1. But this second e®ect is dominated by
the ¯rst (see the Proof of Proposition 4), so that the core government will be more willing














Figure 7: Govt 2's Decision ( zd
2 > 0)
Proposition 5. If Govt 2 defends the core by setting z2 = zd
2, compared to a situation
without subsidies,
(i) aggregate welfare falls,
(ii) region 2 welfare decreases for zd
2 > 0, and
(iii) region 1 welfare increases.
Proof. See appendix D. ¥
This is intuitive, since the allocation of industry is not changed by subsidies. The only
e®ect relevant for welfare is the payment of subsidies. Since these are paid by region 2
residents but part of the subsidy accrues to residents of region 1, subsidies redistribute
from region 2 to region 1. Overall welfare falls since the subsidy redistributes from workers
to capitalists, and this reduces welfare for ¸ > 1
2.
244 Conclusion
The paper studies subsidy competition among asymmetric regions in a model with mobile
capital and agglomeration forces. We start from a situation where industry is agglomerated
in the smaller region for historic reasons, and ask whether subsidy competition can lure
industry to the larger region. When governments maximize a weighted welfare function,
we ¯nd the answer is yes when the welfare weights of workers and capital owners are equal.
In this instance, the smaller region does not prevent the larger region from paying subsidies
which lures all capital to that region. However, when workers' welfare is weighted more
heavily, the smaller region might pay subsidies to capital owners that are just large enough
to prevent them from shifting their capital to the other region. In this case, if the size
di®erence between the regions is not too large, an ine±cient industry location prevails.
Our paper thus provides a formalization of the intuitive argument that, when external
economies are prevalent, jurisdictional competition can improve the spatial allocation of
economic activity (e.g. Duranton, 2008). Unless territorial welfare functions are skewed
towards immobile workers and size di®erences between regions are small, this notion is







2 = 0; (A.1)
using (12) and (13) gives the `break point'
Á
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S > 0 (A.5)
C Locational Forces
The locational forces are obtained by evaluating the di®erent forces at sn = 1
2 for the
symmetric region case, i.e. sl = sk = 1
2.
C.1 Intra-Industry Spillovers
To isolate the intra-industry spillover force we di®erentiate the capital reward gap with
respect to sn, holding ¯xed the market crowding e®ect (the direct e®ect of the industry


















(1 + Á)2 > 0: (A.6)
This expression is positive for our parameter speci¯cations and captures the agglomerative
intra-industry spillover force.
C.2 Inter-Industry Spillovers
Holding ¯xed the market crowding e®ect and intra-industry spillovers yields the deglom-


















(1 + Á)2 < 0: (A.7)
26C.3 Market Crowding E®ect
The second dispersion force denoted as the market crowding e®ect works through the direct













(1 + Á)2 · 0: (A.8)
which is unambiguously non-positive.
D Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
We show that irrespective of the welfare weight ¸, an industry allocation where all ¯rms
are located in the larger region is preferred by the social planner to an allocation with all
¯rms in the smaller region. Comparing the sum of regional welfare for the case where the
core is located in the larger region with the sum of regional welfare for the case where the








(2sl ¡ 1)[¹(¾ ¡ 1) ¡ ®lnÁ]¸
¾ ¡ 1
(A.9)
which is unambiguously positive for sl > 1
2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
Plugging in the respective subsidy levels zd
2 and zmin
1 from (23) and (21) into region 2's






















which is negative for sl > 1
2. It follows that Govt 2 sets z2 = zd




2 ¡ ")) > W P
1 (z2). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) From Proposition 1, we know that without subsidies, welfare is higher if the core
is in the larger region. Evaluating the e®ect of subsidies on welfare in the case where the









27For ¸ = 1
2, this is zero. The same holds for the welfare e®ect of subsidies if the core is in
region 2. Hence, welfare with subsidies is still highest if the core is in the larger region.
(ii) From the proof above we know that W C
1 (zmin
1 (zd
2 ¡ ")) > W P
1 (z2) holds. Since
@WP
1
@z2 > 0 implies W P
1 (z2) > W P
1 (0) for zd
2 > 0 it follows that W C
1 (zmin
1 (zd
2 ¡ ")) > W P
1 (0),
i.e. Govt 1 is better o® after successfully snatching the core compared to the baseline
welfare level. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.











2 ¡ ²);sl;°;¢) = 0:
Part(i) follows immediately from setting ¸ = 1
2 in (A.10). To prove (ii), di®erentiatiation
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³
2sl+1
Á2 ¡ 2sl + 3
´
2(1 + °)¾¾ (2sl ¡ 3)(¸(2sl ¡ 1) + 1)
> 0 (A.13)
for sl;¸ > 1
2.
The expression for d¢=dsl is rather messy and therefore omitted. However, we can
show numerically that it is negative for the parameters used in the paper. Intuitively,
when region 2 becomes smaller, it will be less willing to defend. Formally, we can show
that di®erentiating
d~ sl



























d° > 0 for ¸;sl > 1
2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Since the industry allocation is not a®ected, we need to consider only the e®ect of
subsidies on welfare. This is given by:
Z = (1 ¡ ¸)z2 ¡
(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ sk) + ¸(1 ¡ sl)
1 ¡ sk + 1 ¡ sl
z2 =
(1 ¡ 2¸)(1 ¡ sl)
1 ¡ sk + 1 ¡ sl
z2:
28This expression is negative for ¸ > 1
2, so subsidies decrease welfare.
(ii) and (iii). From
@WC
2 (z2)
@z2 < 0 and
@WP
1 (z2)
@z2 > 0 it follows that W C
2 (zd
2) < W C
2 (0) and
W P
1 (z2) > W P
1 (0) for zd
2 > 0. Residents of region 2 will unambiguously experience a wel-
fare decline whereas households in region 1 experience an unambiguous welfare gain. ¥
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